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THE COMMUNICATIONS BRIDGE: PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS FOR OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM AND BEYOND
At first look such an increase in itself may seem surprisingly excessive, however, the operational mission expansion necessitated voice, video, and data services of significant magnitude. With the advantage of hindsight it appears that a tenfold increase in personnel and equipment would have been more appropriate given the growth of the mission. 2 The network configurations that framed the reach-back communications structure during OEF have heralded an urgent need for the Army to immediately develop and implement new communications doctrine to support the military's achieving full spectrum dominance as articulated in JV2020.
The Army's successes in providing strategic signal support to the warfighters on OEF were anything but easy and nothing short of complex. Nevertheless and in spite of many difficulties, the critical information went through. The daunting task today is now to capitalize on the insights gained from lessons learned and incorporate this understanding of communications into a strategy to support the Army in the interim as it transitions to the Objective Force.
As a baseline this paper will first review communications employed to support OEF in the CENTCOM AOR with specific consideration given to the requirements, planning, and execution, as well as shortcomings and lessons learned. This discussion will provide a reference point for the future communications innovations and doctrinal improvements necessary for the Army Signal Regiment's transformation. Today's increasing asymmetric combat environments provide unique and pivotal challenges to support the warfighter. Three areas that will not be addressed in the scope of this paper are vulnerabilities, operational risks assumed by leaders on the ground during OEF, and the contracting processes that were involved in transitioning tactical communications services to commercial services. Vulnerabilities and operational risks are discussed in the Army Central Command (ARCENT) After Action Review (AAR) draft dated May/June 2002.
Clearly, implementing new communication technologies and doctrine as enablers of Army
Transformation will have a price tag. Leaders at all levels must not fixate on the question, "How can we afford the new technologies and implement new doctrine?"; rather, leaders must conclude that we cannot afford not to. The Army simply cannot maintain its relevance as a fighting force and achieve information superiority, and hence full spectrum dominance, without dedicating the resources for it. The scope of this paper is geared toward the audience of 
REACH-BACK COMMUNICATIONS -THE BUILDING BLOCKS

WHAT IS REACH-BACK COMMUNICATIONS -REALLY?
The term reach-back communications does not have a standard definition either in Joint or Army doctrine. A definition used widely among military communications specialists is that reach-back communications are those communications services that are extended back into a fixed site location, which subsequently connects into the Defense Information Systems Network (DISN). This extension into the DISN provides secure and non-secure data services, voice services and video services. The DISN is defined as: the DOD's [Department of Defense's] consolidated worldwide enterprise level telecommunications infrastructure that provides end to end information transfer network for supporting military operations. It is transparent to its users, facilitates the management of information resources, and is responsive to national security and defense needs under all conditions in the most efficient manner.
The main components of the DISN that support the deployed warfighting commander are his associated telecommunications equipment, long haul telecommunications infrastructure, and fixed facilities that are also referred to as fixed sites. 4 The fixed facility that provides connectivity for these services into the DISN is also more commonly referred to as a Strategic An AN/TSC-143 or TRIBAND system is a complex communications system and is the heart of a medium communications package that will be described later in this paper. The TRIBAND is a prototype system that is unique to the 504 th Signal Battalion, 11 th Signal Brigade.
This asset is a signal system that combines a long haul satellite capability with an onboard switchboard (also referred to as a Switch Multiplex Unit or SMU) that can provide encrypted or unencrypted phones and contains a Promina 400 for signal multiplexing capability. The TRIBAND is appropriately named because it can operate on three different satellite frequency bands all in the SHF range, the X-band, Ku-band and C-band. X-band is also often referred to as military band because of its frequent use by military forces. Ku-band and C-band are commercial satellite bands on the government or DOD may lease airtime, but it is expensive.
By changing out a few antenna parts and wave-guides for the appropriate band, the TRIBAND can be in the footprint of a satellite almost anywhere in the world. Although the terminal can only operate on one of its three bands at a given time, the TRIBAND has a significant advantage over the classic terminals of its size. The AN/TSC-93 can only provide one link to a distant terminal, whereas the TRIBAND is a hub terminal and can connect up to three other This package is supported by 20 personnel, 9 vehicles, and assorted trailers. Overall, intra-theater movement in the AOR did not allow for the regular scheduling and flow of assets into theater. Airfields in the AOR could not support the larger C-5 aircraft, and for the first several months C-17s were also unable to land. Ongoing combat operations and the need to insert troops and equipment during the hours of darkness to minimize U.S. forces' exposure also contributed to the irregular schedule of intra-theater lift. The collective competing priorities and demands for force protection and logistics, coupled with weather restrictions, significantly skewed any reasonable planning factors to establish a realistic timeline to achieve full operational capability for communications systems. provided training assistance on the DRSN phone system and ultimately a soldier to serve as a technician. The newer plug-and-play VTC systems that the brigade purchased greatly simplified VTC training. Unfortunately, despite the best efforts to simplify systems with new technology and products, new equipment also contributed to problems that operators did not realize until after their arrival in theater. One such example was the cable pin outs for the VTC suite TEDs were mismatched. This problem was ultimately resolved, but it did take some time.
To meet the demand for data services in six discretely separate locations, the military hired contractors to serve as systems administrators. By the Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) that serves as a military unit's authorization document for equipment and personnel, there are only two positions in a Theater Tactical Signal Battalion (TTSB) for soldiers to serve as systems administrators. Until contracts were let and the civilian systems administrators arrived on the ground, soldiers worked many late hours and performed at experience levels well above their pay grades to meet the mission. Network management for the SIPRNET and NIPRNET were enormous tasks and sometimes total success was elusive because of a shortage of requisite expertise.
TRIBANDs operating in Ku-band literally saved the day. The DSCS had no more available bandwidth and bandwidth was extremely limited throughout the theater. By operating on the civilian SHF bands, the TRIBANDs provided exceptional flexibility and robustness to a tactical / strategic network that was initially single threaded. The TRIBAND's small footprint added a discriminating advantage by requiring minimal lift assets to move in theater.
LESSONS LEARNED
Although there are numerous lessons learned from strategic reach-back communications provided during OEF deployments, this section will focus on the major shortcomings in doctrinal procedures, training, equipment and personnel. This will include those that were identified and corrected, as well as those that still require solutions. The perspective for improving reach-back contingency communications will remain at a hierarchical level -specifically the communications support for an ARFOR or JTF Headquarters.
In some cases initial communications installation and planning on OEF were held hostage to the policies and procedures of routine operations at the STEP sites. Responsiveness to network problems is absolutely crucial when ground and air forces are in the midst of conducting combat operations. Additionally, STEP operators must identify and troubleshoot any critical systems outages, and immediately notify supervisors and network managers. The Satellite Access Authorizations (SAAs) and the Gateway Access Authorizations (GAAs) process was also too slow in response to the dynamic mission tempo on the ground. It is clearly a peacetime bureaucratic system. Delays in implementing changes and updates to the network need to be streamlined or eliminated, if there are not corrective mechanisms in place to remedy specific outages up front. Last and perhaps most significant is a lack of standardization of equipment, training, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) and interfaces among the various STEP sites. This is despite the fact that most of the equipment uses standardized protocols.
The Command and Control (C2) architecture for network installation must take special mission needs into account. Special Operations Forces (SOF) teams required a majority of the single channel TACSAT bandwidth to accomplish their missions. As a result, the signal systems controllers and installers were forced to rely on Iridium phone sets with secure sleeves to engineer network planning and installation. In many cases Iridium phones proved to be unreliable. The poor reception dropped many calls and adversely impacted the rapid establishment of secure, reliable, voice and data communications for subscribers. Although some single-channel High Frequency (HF) radio systems were available, an HF C2 Network was neither given a priority nor established. Planners must ensure that theater command and control networks necessary to install strategic reach-back communications systems have a high priority. If the primary C2 system is preempted, then another reliable system must replace it to ensure the expeditious installation of communications services for users.
Traditionally, C4 equipment is the responsibility of the owner to install, operate and maintain. These older guidelines worked well, and saved significant signal manpower when soldiers provided communications on an area support basis. A new dynamic that has evolved in recent years is that the "user owned and operated" rules do not apply. Users no longer have the technical ability or skills required to perform network and data management tasks.
Interoperability is absolutely critical. Today, installing computers from different systems and multiple organizations into military data networks is a detailed and complex process. Even with the urgency of an ongoing mission in a forward-deployed area, minimum certification requirements and checks must be met, or there could likely be back doors or known vulnerabilities that adversaries could exploit.
If the end-state or exit strategy for communications teams is predicated on replacing tactical communications with commercial equipment, the commercialization planning must begin immediately. The norm now is to free up limited, strategic resources for follow on missions.
Leaders must assign a project officer to oversee the project. Tasks that appear to be simple, such as the installation of a DKET terminal for extension back into a STEP site or other earth station, or a cable installation in Bagram to free up tactical assets and expand support, are not simple at all. Working in an undeveloped theater complicates matters. It takes a great deal of coordination to deliver all necessary equipment needed to support the mission. In many countries, clearances are required to ship in commercial equipment. Even with a long lead-time and the use of military airlift assets, installers must still expend considerable planning effort to ensure mission success. Lastly, synchronizing systems cutover is key to minimizing service interruptions.
Individual operator training is absolutely essential. Soldiers must be first technically proficient on the specific piece of equipment for which they are responsible. Next, they must understand how to integrate their equipment into the overall communications system or network.
Integrated training at all levels is an absolute must. On the job training in the field is not a replacement for formal instruction and should never be the norm. Many operators received a significant amount of formal training to install, operate, and troubleshoot data systems; however, most did not have an assigned Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) for automation.
Additionally, pre-programmed routers and servers did not necessarily expedite mission execution in theater. Changing configurations and operators' limited working knowledge of data systems plagued data teams in initially installing an error-free network. Another example is commercial and tactical fiber optic training. Use of tactical fiber optic cable maximizes data throughput. Unfortunately fiber optic training is a highly specialized skill. Course availability coupled with associated costs limit the number of trained operators. Every cable and wire installer (31L) should receive fiber optic training.
Training must be realistic. Too often military exercises are dependent on cell phones and leased circuits for communications paths between geographically separated participants.
Organizations must train and practice using the communications resources or a like capability that they will have when deployed in an austere, uncertain environment. Staffs should not develop their plans and battle rhythms using communications resources or data networks that will not be available during real world deployments. Soldiers must train as they fight.
Leaders must deploy with personnel who have the right skill sets. Certain skill sets are vital to mission accomplishment. Cable and wire personnel (31Ls), automation specialists (74Bs), and network technicians (251As) are in absolutely critical demand. Signal leaders on the ground must know how to work with the user-customer and be technically and tactically proficient. Most importantly, leaders must understand and interpret user requirements to validate actual needs in a dynamic and rapidly changing environment. Although successful on the OEF mission, communications leaders and soldiers expended a great deal of time, effort, and synergy in developing and training communications teams from multiple units. Units must be structured and equipment and personnel assigned in the configurations in which they deploy.
Too much cross-leveling and reorganizing is a significant impediment to training and mission accomplishment.
Finally, the biggest lesson learned was "The only thing that doesn't change is the fact that everything changes."
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TRANSFORMATION
Joint Vision (JV) 2020 states that the military must be dominant across the "full spectrum of military operations -persuasive in peace, decisive in war, preeminent in any form of conflict". 15 To achieve this full spectrum dominance, the interleaving theme that binds dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full dimensional protection coupled together with innovation is information superiority. "Information superiority is the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting the enemy's ability to do the same." 16 Communications professionals must provide the means and outline the ways to achieve this end. The missing link at this point is "How does the signal regiment transform towards the objective force?"
Today if one would ask anyone in the DOD "What does the Objective Force look like?", the answer would most likely be "I don't know, but I will know it when I see it." In the meantime the military is extremely focused in the process of transformation, and the Army, as well as the remainder of the DOD, is heavily engaged. Transformation, after all, is all about relevance.
When the cold war went by the wayside during the last decade of the 20 th century, budget managers in the U.S. Government looked to save money by terminating programs, equipment, and systems that were no longer needed. They also sought to back the programs that would leverage technology to provide greater benefits in the future. The responsibility to set the course for future programs and provide the critical enablers to meet the Army's transformation information requirements falls upon the Signal Regiment. There are many options for transformation and each has a cost.
At this time the Army has chosen the Warfighter Information Network - Tactical (WIN-T) as its solution for Army communications transformation. "WIN-T is the Army's Objective Force (OF) and when required, the Joint Force Commander's tactical deployed communications network…." 17 WIN-T will have an integrated network infrastructure that will provide voice, video, and data services throughout the battlespace and integrate the Global Information Grid (GIG). The GIG is defined as:
The globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities, associated processes and personnel for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating and managing information on demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel. The Global Information Grid (GIG) includes all owned and leased communications and computing systems and services, software (including applications), data, security services and other associated services necessary to achieve information superiority.
Unfortunately, under the current development timelines WIN-T may not be fielded for another ten years or longer. Now, the more difficult question becomes "what to do in the meantime?"
The need for a WIN-T like system is not an Army unique requirement. Joint and combined JTF commanders require reach-back communications to integrate their battlespace. JUST BECAUSE WE CAN, SHOULD WE?
OEF provides the most recent example of communications challenges that the Army faces as it transforms towards the Objective Force. As already stated, deployed forces are more heavily reliant upon strategic reach-back communications than ever before, and this dependency is data centric. As technology continues to evolve, communications specialists can provide more information with greater ease down to subordinate echelons and vice versa. As the appetite for data communications increases, so does a fundamental challenge. book is dependent upon either unlimited bandwidth, or the availability of bandwidth on demand.
Bandwidth availability is currently not limitless and will, for the foreseeable future, continue to be a restricting factor in the military's conduct of information operations.
Commanders and leaders at all levels must take a hard look and understand the subtle distinctions between the want for information and the actual requirement for information.
Network planners, systems administrators, and information operations personnel must prioritize bandwidth availability with a systems approach to assist commanders and staffs. A strategic data network bridged to a remote area must be designed with constraints to preclude data bottlenecks and latency of service. If improperly managed or prioritized, data imagery provides one of the best examples of a valid requirement that could bring most data systems to a standstill. Transmitting detailed imagery requires a lot of processing power and bandwidth.
Since imagery can easily fill a system to capacity, only those users who have a valid requirement for it should be granted systems permissions.
A BUSINESS CASE FOR LEADER INVOLVEMENT IN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (IT)
An article in last October's Harvard Business Review entitled "Six IT Decisions Your IT People Shouldn't Make" discusses how companies that managed their investment in IT most successfully were those that had their senior managers taking an active leadership role in managing a handful of critical key IT decisions. 22 The authors recommend that senior managers should take leadership responsibility for six decisions.
The first three have to do with strategy: (1) How much should we spend on IT? (2) Which business process should receive our IT dollars? (3) Which IT capabilities need to be company wide? The second three relate to execution: (4) How good do our IT services really need to be? (5) to the ones discussed earlier in this paper.
Today the Army supports multiple JTF sized missions of strategic importance, which are a data dependent and require strategic communications services. As previously stated, networks must be planned, installed, operated and maintained. The ITSB reduces the need to conduct major task organizing and cross-leveling by standardizing the way EAC units are structured and ensuring the correct MOSs are aligned with the equipment. The major change for the signal battalion will be to shift from four line companies to three. Personnel strength that is harvested from the fourth company is placed on unit MTOEs for data and cable teams and in the battalion headquarters for network management functions.
The ITSB concept is still a work in progress and would apply to Reserve and National Guard forces as well. The Army Signal Regiment must be involved in validating the MOS structure and ensuring the training base is realigned to support the ITSB equipment list. This is especially important for TROPO systems because the Signal School stopped teaching TROPO several years ago. Additionally, those personnel who work specialized data, switch and transmission equipment in the ITSBs should receive a functional skill identifier to ensure personnel who have received expensive specialty training can be tracked to ramp up capabilities as required.
MORTGAGING OUR FUTURE
One pitfall leaders must avoid in re-looking at what the interim EAC signal structure should be is to oversimplify the problem. Outsourcing services to provide capabilities is not the solution. Outsourcing cannot provide trained soldiers who will ensure the combatant commander will have the requisite communications capabilities during short notice worldwide deployments. Commercial communications work well for exit strategies, but even the DKET terminal at K2 in Uzbekistan took a month to install once the civilian operators and equipment were on the ground.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
CONCLUSIONS
Communications planners must be technically and tactically proficient, and be thorough in operational mission planning. C2 networks are an absolute must to facilitate the expeditious installation of communications networks. A C2 network for systems troubleshooting, fault isolation, and speedy circuit restoration is not a luxury item and should never be competing with other mission needs. Data networks are complex by nature and experts must be brought in at the beginning of the planning process. Commanders and planners cannot delude themselves and oversimplify the detailed efforts required to engineer, install, and manage a networksecurity considerations increase these complexities. Additionally, a realistic level of effort must be dedicated up front in identifying as many requirements as early on as possible. Planners and warfighters cannot be dismissive in realistically allocating resources to satisfy these requirements. Networks always grow and expand, and quite simply "the user will consume as much as the user is given." Network planners, installers, and managers must always be prepared for mission expansion; however, a single threaded system, even though it may provide connectivity, does not meet the definition or requirement for a network.
Contingency communications packages are at the heart of providing the deployed warfighter information superiority in this asymmetric age. Deployments over the past decade have demonstrated that EAC signal MTOEs do not reflect how EAC communications units actually deploy and support their subscribers. The requirements for secure data and VTC services have steadily increased over the past five years. The most alarming concern is that data requirements are not reflected on communications units' MTOEs in terms of equipment and personnel. If WIN-T will not be fielded for ten years or more, an interim EAC structure to support ARFOR and JTF contingency requirements is needed now. EAC communications doctrine must reflect how units will deploy to support subscribers and this must correlate to equipment and personnel in the MTOE.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The Signal Regiment's leadership cannot afford to waste any more time in waiting for an EAC communications solution to appear. Senior decision-makers must choose how to proceed and provide an interim communications solution until WIN-T is fielded. The ITSB is a satisfactory near-term / interim solution. The ITSB standardizes units across the National Guard and Reserves and makes their structure relevant to support today's military operations.
Equipment that is available in the active duty units must be cross-leveled. Shortages in the reserves and guard need to be identified, a viable cost-effective analysis conducted and a plan to resolve the shortages executed. The greatest expenses will be in the cost for satellite terminal and data package shortages. Army and joint forces should not continue to conduct routine exercises using post, camp, and station communications resources and expect the same capabilities and quality of service in a tactical, forward deployed area.
The Signal Center at Fort Gordon, Georgia must reevaluate and review the training programs no only for the ITSBs but specifically for the data and TROPO teams. At a minimum, soldiers who have unique communications and data services abilities must be issued skill identifiers. Failure to identify and track soldiers with special skills will detract from unit readiness and add to training costs. Additionally, Mobile Training Teams (MTTs), based out of the Signal Center, could greatly enhance operator training and education in the field, as well as provide substantial cost savings.
Improved data compression techniques may provide some relief to the data congestion dilemmas, but data compression is not the sole solution. Leader involvement in establishing user priorities will have the biggest positive impact on data throughput. Most importantly, leaders must enforce and educate soldiers that the old warrior ethos "train as we fight" applies to all aspects of communications.
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